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WILLIAM POOLE  HAS OFFERED  a  model  of  incomes policy  that  is  like 
balancing  an egg. The policy  can be far too oppressive-the egg falls  left; 
or it can be totally ineffectual-the egg falls right. Finding a middle 
approach  for policy  that works  is like trying  to stand  the egg on its head: 
It's clearly  unstable  and can't  be done. 
I don't  think  anyone  in the administration  is contemplating  a permanent, 
comprehensive  set of controls.  And it is certainly  not the program  that I 
am prepared  to defend or that most economists  who favor an incomes 
policy  of some sort  have  in mind.  What  is relevant  is a middle-of-the-road 
program  that can be adopted after the ninety-day  freeze. Whether  the 
middle  road on incomes  policy can work depends  on the environment  it 
has to work in. My view of the environment  is different  from  Poole's.  In 
the sand,  the egg stands  on its head very  easily. 
Recently  I wrote  about  structural  changes  that  have  led  to a deterioration 
of the tradeoff  between  inflation  and unemployment.'  There  I developed 
measures  of labor market  tightness  that took account of these changes 
and showed  that labor  markets  had been extremely  tight during  the 1966- 
69 period.  An inflation  model  based  on these  measures  explained  the rapid 
increase  of wages  and  prices  over  this interval  and  through  the first  half of 
1970.  But even the structural  changes  identified  there  do not account  for 
the rate of inflation  the United States  has been suffering  recently.  Labor 
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markets  are  not tighter  now than  they  were  in 1965,  even  by my measures. 
Operating  rates are not higher  now than in the early 1960s.  There  is no 
way today's inflation  can be seen as a result of tight labor markets  or 
excess  demand  in product  markets;  those  conditions  exist  in only  a few  iso- 
lated  sectors  of the economy.  Nor can  today's  inflation  be explained  by the 
weight  in the wage  index  of long-term  wage  settlements  that are  still catch- 
ing up for past  inflation,  although  these  headline  makers  may have  impor- 
tant indirect,  demonstration  effects. 
Although  the concept lacks theoretical  elegance,  I am persuaded  that 
inflation is now perpetuated  to  an important  degree because of high 
"habitual"  rates  of wage  and  price  increase.  Althoughwe  conceal  a lot of our 
ignorance  about  the  inflation  process  when  we  employ  past  changes  in wages 
or prices  to help  explain  the present,  we have  to attribute  a large  impact  to 
recent  experience  in order  to explain  today's  situation.  But  the  present  rapid 
wage  increases  need  not imply  that  shifts  have  occurred  in some  well-defined 
labor supply  curve  that would  lead to a model of accelerating  inflation.  I 
see  no evidence  for  this  interpretation  and  choose  the  description  "habitual" 
to emphasize  this. If this habitual  situation  in wage setting  is interrupted, 
there  need  be no consequences  for real  output  and  employment.  I am offer- 
ing a treadmill  explanation  of the present  situation.  A middle-road  incomes 
policy  is designed  to get  us off  the treadmill,  down  to a lower  habitual  aver- 
age rate of wage and price  increase. 
In this environment,  I cannot share  Poole's misgiving  about a middle- 
road  incomes  policy.  He fears  that a policy  that is enforceable  only against 
large  firms  and unions  would  find  controlled  firms  unable  to meet the de- 
mand  for some of its products.  In this situation,  he sees customers  forced 
to switch  their  purchases  to uncontrolled  firms,  and  this development  lead- 
ing either  to broader  controls  or  to their  complete  abandonment.  In today's 
economy,  would  this really  be a problem?  Not only are markets  not tight 
enough,  but controls  need not be so rigid. 
I am not dissuaded  by Poole's  finding  that, for nineteen  out of ninety- 
eight  product  categories,  wholesale  prices  rose  more  than  7 percent  during 
the past year while average  wholesale  prices  rose only 3.6 percent.  Some 
of the nineteen  were agricultural  products,  raw materials  whose prices 
are set in world markets,  or products  fabricated  from them. Some may 
have  been  industrial  products  whose  price  increases  resulted  from  increased 
labor costs. We do know that the first-year  cost of many  wage increases 
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we know  that  long-run  productivity  experience  varies  substantially  among 
individual  industries,  so that any given change  in hourly wage costs is 
translated  into widely  differing  changes  in standard  unit labor  costs. Thus 
Poole's reported  dispersion  in price behavior makes a  good case for 
flexible  controls  and intelligent  price  guidelines.  But it does not persuade 
me that suppressed  excess demand  would be a problem.  We could, of 
course,  create  that problem  for ourselves-say, by trying  to hold the price 
of lumber  in the midst of the current  housing  boom. But that straw  man 
should  not be the subject  of discussion. 
If the nation  can emerge  from  the ninety-day  freeze  with a deescalation 
policy aimed at wages and prices broadly  but, in practice,  enforceable 
only in labor and product  markets  where  market  power  is considerable, 
I would  expect  favorable  results  and only small  costs. To opt for this kind 
of program  is not to imply that oligopolistic  industries  and powerful 
unions  are the main cause of the inflation.  But they are a good place to 
concentrate  an incomes  policy  for several  reasons. 
If we are to slow down the treadmill,  highly visible price and wage 
situations  are the one place in which the government  can call attention 
to the new rules  and show it means  business.  This kind of demonstration 
should  help  reduce  the present  "habitual"  rate  of price  and  wage  increases 
in other  sectors  as well. I would  expect  weak  markets  over  a long enough 
period  to do it too. But that seems  to be a long and costly process. 
Furthermore,  while  these concentrated  sectors  did not give birth  to the 
inflation,  they  have  been  an important  factor  in keeping  it so healthy.  Hav- 
ing been  late to get started  and  having  finally  caught  up, they are  unlikely, 
of their own accord,  to lead the way down  toward  price  stability.  That is 
not what union members  pay their dues for. I find it somewhat  contra- 
dictory  that the same observers  who doubt that such a limited  incomes 
policy  could work  frequently  stress  structural  changes  to diminish  market 
power  among  concentrated  industries  and unions  as a longer-run  inflation 
cure. 
Finally,  I want  limited  and  flexible  controls  because  I do not want  more. 
A price-wage  board  can  hope  to exercise  control  in these  visible  sectors  and 
do so in a fairly  flexible  way. They  can consider  ten appeals  a month  with 
some  care.  They  cannot  sensibly  monitor  prices  and  wages  everywhere.  I am 
against  comprehensive  controls  just as Poole is and for the same  reasons. 
The initial  ninety-day  freeze  is short  enough-and voluntary  enough-to 
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start  off. But I want  to emerge  from  it with a limited  and flexible  system. 
The circumstances  behind  the present  inflation  make  this a particularly 
favorable  time for such a limited  program.  With  excess  demands  virtually 
absent,  it is hard  to visualize  significant  misallocations  arising  from  a wage 
standard  that  deescalated  average  wage  increases  to, say,  a 5 percent  annual 
rate. Why should we expect to see the steel companies,  who are under 
scrutiny,  lose workers  to small,  competitive  firms  who are  not?  Firms  have 
been granting  large  wage increases  because  they have become  the general 
pattern.  If the treadmill  slows,  so does  the wage  increase  that an individual 
firm  must  grant  to meet  its labor  requirements.  To raise  wages  faster  than 
this, firms would have to behave  irrationally  just because  they are not 
under  the scrutiny  of controls. 
Of course,  there will be some reallocations  through  changing  relative 
wages,  but they do not require  today's average  inflation  rate. Resources 
were reallocated  in the early 1960s  with no loss of efficiency  and with a 
stable  price level. Nor need the resource  transfer  be a flow governed  by 
wage movements  in the uncontrolled  sector  alone. A flexible  control  sys- 
tem would permit  promotions,  competition  for particular  skills in short 
supply,  and similar  departures  from any general  rule. 
Under  a new  incomes  policy,  I expect  prices  generally  to be governed  by 
costs and so to present  no special  problem.  For the areas  where  market 
power  is great,  a price-wage  board  would  monitor  price  movements.  While 
excessive  price  increases  in oligopolistic  sectors  are not the main  cause of 
the recent  inflation,  there are reasons  to guard  against  them: First, it is 
important  to demonstrate  an evenhanded  treatment  of wages and prices 
under the incomes policy; second, we want to ensure a prompt pass- 
through of cost moderation  into prices; third, we want to  avoid the 
occasional  instance  in which  administered  pricing  might  contribute  inde- 
pendently  to inflation.  The biggest problems  would come from a few 
sectors  in which  classical  market  power  is not the issue  but in which  prices 
have been rising  inordinately  for special  reasons.  If allowed  to continue, 
these  increases  would  make  cooperation  under  the incomes  policy  in other 
sectors  more  difficult.  For example,  medical  costs  have  been  rising  rapidly. 
Here  the government  could slow price  increases  by using  its control  over 
the medicare  and medicaid  programs. 
A more difficult  problem  for incomes  policies  arises  when  the economy 
expands  more  and markets  begin  to tighten.  Even  here,  an incomes  policy 
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despite  their  almost  totally  voluntary  nature.  What  we see as a fairly  grad- 
ual  tradeoff  curve  between  inflation  and  aggregate  market  tightness  arises,  I 
believe,  as an increasing  fraction  of only  loosely  connected  individual  mar- 
kets grows  tighter.  Adjustments  among  the markets  takes place continu- 
ously  through  changing  relative  wages  and prices.  As the fraction  of tight 
markets  grows,  the price  changes  average  out to be more  inflationary.  On 
this highly  simplified  view, an incomes  policy that modified  the absolute 
price  increases  in the tighter  sectors  could still permit  the needed  adjust- 
ments,  but with  less net price  increase  than  now occurs.  An incomes  policy 
need not break  down until a substantial  part of the economy  experienced 
excess  demand  and certainly  not before  markets  grew  much tighter  than 
they  are  today. 
If over the next year the price deflator  for the private  sector  could be 
slowed  to a 21/2  percent  rate of increase  while real output  grew  at a rate 
that noticeably  reduced  unemployment,  the policy would have been a 
clear success.  Before the new initiatives,  there was virtually  no sign of 
slowdown  in the inflation  rate, and policy makers  seemed  inhibited  from 
stimulating  the economy  to speed  up real growth  by the fear  of worsening 
the inflation.  Over  the last four quarters,  real gross  national  product  grew 
only 2.2 percent.  Even a doubling  of that rate of expansion  would  merely 
have held unemployment  rates  near  recent  levels, and there  was little sign 
that  the expansion  would  be faster  than  that. 
Since  there  are other  papers  in this volume  dealing  with whether  a con- 
tinued  high rate of inflation  is tolerable,  I will not address  the question 
of living  with what  we have versus  trying  to correct  it. An incomes  policy 
imposes  some costs, so if inflation  is really  costless,  we should  not have 
one. But  I take  it for granted  that  policy  will  fight  against  a rate  of inflation 
like the current  one. This  means  the choice  we face is between  an incomes 
policy and letting  our concern  over inflation  take the unemployment  rate 
where  it will. Poole's optimism  that a "do nothing"  policy will achieve  a 
good result  is hard  to accept,  not only because  the result  is not assured, 
but because  the price  of waiting  for something  good to happen  is so high. 
I am not a sailor,  and Poole is an expert,  so it might  be wiser  to forgo  his 
sailing  analogy.  Nevertheless,  I always  thought  that on a serious  voyage, 
sailors  carried  a small  motor  on board  precisely  so that they  would  not be 
at the mercy of the winds. The economic  winds have not been blowing 
favorably,  and a firm  incomes  policy  seems  a good way  to stop our  drifting 
for now. 